Merz and the making of a European Defence Community
Author: Marko Laughlin
Introduction
In a landmark development for Europe’s political and security landscape, Friedrich Merz, leader of Germany’s centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has secured an electoral mandate to become Chancellor of Germany. His rise to power signals a pivotal shift in German domestic policy and the ambitions of the European Union (EU) for strategic autonomy. A centrepiece of Merz’s campaign was a bold commitment to increase defence spending and spearhead the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC), a long-debated idea now gaining new momentum amid the backdrop of the Ukraine war, increasing geopolitical uncertainty, and the return of a more isolationist US foreign policy under a second Trump administration .
Merz has argued that Germany’s constitutional changes to the Basic Law, which would allow for expanded borrowing to fund the military, are not just of national concern but instead part of a broader European project. “The decision we are making today can also be seen as the first major step towards a new European defence community. A defence community that includes not only EU member states but also other countries eager to build this together with us” he stated in the Bundestag. This approach echoes growing discontent across the EU with the bloc’s dependence on US military capabilities, particularly within NATO, and reflects a wider shift in favour of developing autonomous European capacities to act collectively and decisively in future security crises.
Legal Frameworks: Balancing Sovereignty with Integration
There are several key legal considerations governments need to make to create EDC given their individual constitution around defence and the existing NATO regulation. Currently, each member state of the EU adopts independent and different defence planning under the principle of state sovereignty, as enshrined in EU law. To create a European Defence Community, which would require a more coherent defence policy and regional military force, this sovereignty has to be balanced with collective planning to provision for deeper cooperation.
Legal mechanisms exist to facilitate this transition. Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), introduced through the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), permits the formulation of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and allows for the creation of joint missions, development of joint capabilities, and the potential for mutual defence under certain conditions. In addition, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), projects for voluntary defence collaboration among EU states launched in 2017, supports joint capability development and coordinated investment, laying the groundwork for a potential EU-wide defence apparatus.
Yet despite this legal infrastructure, the creation of a truly integrated European Defence Force would test the limits of current treaties and would require reinterpretation or formal amendment, particularly on uniting sovereign defence powers. Additionally, any steps toward a European Defence Force must be balanced with NATO’s existing legal obligations. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, most EU states are already bound to collective defence commitments through NATO. A parallel EU military force would have to carefully align itself with these responsibilities, ensuring it is viewed as complementary rather than competitive, particularly by members such as Poland and the Baltic states, who fear undermining US guarantees and protection.
Practical Political and Legal Actions Taken
Since his electoral victory, Merz has made defence diplomacy a cornerstone of his early administration. Bilateral meetings with French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have focused on aligning national defence priorities and pushing forward deeper cooperation through the CSDP and PESCO. Public speeches and Bundestag debates have been strategically timed to build momentum, while draft white papers from the German Ministry of Defence propose legal routes for forming an integrated command structure under Article 42(2) TEU.
Germany has also begun advocating for an EU-level Defence Commissioner, a role that would streamline legislative coordination and provide a unified legal voice for defence initiatives. For instance, during the 2025 Munich Security Conference, Merz proposed the creation of this role in a joint statement with French President Macron, arguing it would “enhance the EU’s operational coherence and give strategic weight to its foreign policy”. The proposal gained initial backing from the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence, which has since opened consultations on its legal feasibility under Article 241 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFUE).
Similarly, digital campaigns supported by Germany and Merz across EU capitals aim to garner public support by framing the EDC as essential for protecting Europe’s autonomy in an increasingly volatile global order. One example is the #EuropeDefends initiative launched in March 2025 by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which features multilingual social media content, testimonials from Ukrainian and Baltic military officials, and videos on the economic and security benefits of a unified defence strategy. The campaign is designed to increase engagement ahead of upcoming referendums and parliamentary debates in member states like the Netherlands and Finland.
Nonetheless, resistance remains. Eastern European states, whose security calculus is deeply tied to NATO and the US, view Merz’s proposal with scepticism. Hungary and Slovakia have already voiced concerns over sovereignty loss and the lack of clarity on the chain of command structures. From a legal standpoint, any treaty amendment would likely trigger constitutional reviews or referendums in several EU states, raising the likelihood of political deadlock similar to that seen during past attempts to ratify an EU constitution.
Commercial and Strategic Significance
The commercial implications of an integrated European Defence Force are substantial. The EU’s fragmented procurement system has long been criticised for inefficiency. A centralised or standardised procurement strategy could unlock internal markets, streamlining defence spending and increasing cost-effectiveness. It would also reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers, particularly from the US, and bolster the European defence industrial base. Companies such as Airbus (which already co-produces the Eurofighter), Dassault (maker of France’s Rafale jets), and Rheinmetall (a key German arms manufacturer) stand to benefit significantly from long-term EU contracts if the EDC materialises. The 2023 agreement between France and Germany to jointly develop a next-generation Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) is one example of how industrial integration might play out under a broader defence framework. Moreover, the EU’s European Defence Fund (EDF), with a proposed €8 billion budget for research and development, offers a commercial engine for innovation, incentivising small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms alike to invest in dual-use technologies and integrated defence platforms.
Strategic Implications: A New Global Role for the EU?
If Merz’s initiative succeeds, it could fundamentally reshape the EU’s geopolitical posture. By transitioning from a soft power actor reliant on economic and diplomatic tools to one with credible hard power capabilities, the EU would emerge as a more autonomous security provider. This shift could recalibrate relations with the US, redefine NATO’s role, and offer the EU more leverage in global negotiations, from Arctic defence strategy to Indo-Pacific security Cooperation.
Yet this would not be without risk. As seen in the ongoing debate over F-16 deliveries to Ukraine, divergent national interests remain a challenge. Legal oversight mechanisms, such as an independent European Military Ethics Board or a strengthened role for the European Court of Justice in military affairs, may be necessary to maintain transparency, compliance with humanitarian law, and public trust.
Conclusion
Friedrich Merz’s ascent to the German chancellorship marks a decisive moment in the evolution of European security. His proposal for a European Defence Force, while grounded in existing legal frameworks like the Lisbon Treaty and PESCO, stretches their application into uncharted territory. Legally, politically, and commercially, the stakes are immense. If successful, this initiative could transform Europe into a strategically autonomous actor, capable of collective military action and industrial self-reliance. But its success will depend on carefully calibrated legal reforms, political unity across a diverse union, and a robust commercial strategy that ensures both economic inclusivity and strategic resilience.
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